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NATIONAL
JULIA JONES
A jubilant Lt. Robert Goodman in Syria, with Jesse Jackson and U.S. Ambassador Robert Paganelli.
The Challenge of A Black 
Presidential Candidacy
The fundam ental 
relationship between Blacks 
and the Democratic Party 
m ust be renegotiated. N o  
longer can Blacks allow 
Democrats to take them and  
their votes fo r granted.
Jesse L. Jackson,
The Washington Post,
April 10, 1983.
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By Robert C. Smith
and Joseph P. McCormick, II
Five days after Christmas, the Rev. Jesse Jackson was pictured on the front page of The Wash­ington Post with Syrian Ambas­sador to the United States, Rafic Jouejati. 
The occasion was Jackson’s departure for 
Syria to seek the release of Navy Lt. 
Robert 0. Goodman, who was captured 
after his fighter plane was shot down on 
December 4, 1983.
Amid reports from Syrian officials that 
Donald Rumsfeld, President Reagan’s 
special Middle East envoy, had not dis­
cussed Goodman’s fate during high-level 
talks in Syria, Jackson approached the Sy­
rian government with a request to visit 
Damascus and discuss Goodman’s physi­
cal condition and possible release.1
The following week, the government 
of Syria released Lt. Goodman. Jesse 
Jackson, a private citizen, albeit a candi­
date for the presidency, had succeeded in 
pulling off the biggest foreign policy coup 
by any non-incumbent in recent campaign 
history.
This event did a number of things. 
First, and perhaps foremost, it gave Jack- 
son a great deal of sustained (free) media 
exposure. Given his comparatively late 
start in the race for the nomination, and 
the considerable financial distance be­
tween him and the Democratic front­
runners, this was no small feat.
Second, it provided Jackson with the 
opportunity to lay claim that he is an ef­
fective leader, thereby reinforcing his 
criticism of the political leadership of both 
the Democratic and Republican Parties.
Finally, the Syria-Goodman episode 
has placed Jackson in a very strong posi­
tion to mold public opinion on the issues 
and to challenge the American party sys­
tem in order that Blacks may have a more
direct role in shaping the national gov­
ernment’s approach to dealing with im­
portant domestic and foreign policy is­
sues.
The significance, then, of Jackson’s Sy­
rian mission is that he has achieved for 
himself a national pulpit rarely enjoyed by 
Blacks in American politics. The question 
is: What is the message he intends to de­
liver to his new congregation, the Ameri­
can electorate?
The Strategic Debate Over 
A Black Presidential Candidacy
The strategic implications of a Black pres­
idential candidacy in 1984 have been 
analyzed in scores of newspaper articles 
and columns, and in a series of papers by 
academicians and professional campaign 
strategists. Analysts have given consid­
eration to the number of delegates a 
Black candidate is likely to win; to ques­
tions of campaign organization and financ­
ing; to the question of which Democratic 
candidate is likely to be helped or hurt by 
the insurgency, and to whether Ronald 
Reagan’s re-election prospects are en­
hanced.
Attention has also been given to the 
impact of the candidacy on the Black lead­
ership group’s cohesiveness and efficacy; 
to the impact of the candidacy on Black 
voter turn-out and the election of Blacks 
to other offices; to the question of 
whether the candidacy will intensify racial 
polarization in the electorate; to the ques­
tion of whether the candidacy will con­
tribute to the Democratic Party’s sup­
posed image as a captive of “special inter­
e s ts ,” and to questions of Jackson’s 
character and competency.2
These analyses, while useful, are in­
herently problematic, given the dynamics 
of the politics of presidential choice in the 
United States. The art of political fore­
casting by journalists and academics is 
simply too crude to provide anything
other than speculative answers to most of 39 
the questions posed.
Ample evidence of the problematic 
character of such pre-election analyses is 
available to anyone who wishes to exam­
ine the writing of journalistic and 
academic pundits a year prior to the elec­
tions of 1968,1972,1976, and 1980.3 Such 
analyses are useful for purposes of dis­
cussion and debate but should not be 
taken as either a diagnosis of the situation 
or as a guide to action because, given the 
volatility of recent presidential elections, 
one simply cannot predict the impact of 
the Jackson candidacy on the outcome of 
the 1984 election. This is especially the 
case given the insurgency or “movement” 
character of the Jackson campaign.
In addition, such analyses typically 
overlook a fundamental purpose of a pres­
idential campaign. In his elegant treatise,
The American Presidency (1976), Grant 
McConnell writes:
The President performs one of his most im­
portant services before he ever reaches 
office. This service consists very simply of 
campaigning. He shares this service with 
his opponent and, indeed, with all would- 
be candidates who have been eliminated in 
the long tortuous process of national 
choice, for the process of selecting a presi­
dent is sometimes as important a feature of 
the office as the emergence of a particular 
individual as president. The contest-and 
all the conferring, caucusing, bargaining, 
and scheming-is the indispensable means 
by which each four years the record of the 
past is reviewed and a new assessment of 
the state of the nation is made by the people.
Here is the way in which old compromises 
are examined, and perhaps revised, and 
new ones made among the many elements 
of the population. It is the occasion upon 
which every citizen is called on to think of 
him or herself as an American.
If one accepts McConnell’s proposition 
that the “process of electing a president is
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40 sometimes as important a feature of the 
office as the emergence of a particular in­
dividual as president, ” then it seems ap­
propriate to analyze the Jackson in­
surgency not in terms of “strategy” and 
“tactics” as these are conventionally un­
derstood, but rather one should examine 
it systemically, i. e ., in terms of its impact 
on the American party system and the 
future direction of public policy.
This is the purpose of this analysis. 
Specifically, we examine Jackson’s candi­
dacy in terms of its potential to (1) con­
tribute to the development of an authentic 
liberal-progressive agenda and consti­
tuency and (2) its potential to contribute 
to Black political empowerment, inde­
pendence, and leverage in American elec­
toral politics.
Our assessment of the success of his 
campaign is based not on the number of 
delegates obtained, nor on whether 
the Democratic front-runners or Reagan 
are helped or hurt, but instead on the na­
ture of Jackson’s definition of the Black 
predicament and the consequent ideology 
and policies he argues are necessary to 
address that predicament.
Also, this assessment is based on the 
extent to which Jackson is willing to chal­
lenge the Democratic Party in order to 
build an independent base of Black power 
in the party system. In our view, these 
are the fundamental challenges of and to 
Jackson. The success or failure of his 
campaign, in the final analysis will be de­
termined on the basis of how he and the 
party system meet these challenges.
The Challenge of Ideology
The Democratic Party is under pressure 
to abandon its progressive heritage and 
the unfinished liberal agenda in order to 
realign itself with the alleged conserva­
tive mood of the electorate. The first chal­
lenge of the Jackson campaign, therefore, 
is to maintain the liberal hour in a time of 
conservative reaction.
Principal proponents of this strategy of 
abandoning the liberal agenda are Hamil­
ton Jordan and Bert Lance, erstwhile pro­
teges of President Jimmy Carter. In a 
series of speeches and conferences 
across the South, Lance and Jordan have 
argued that if the Democratic Party 
wishes to carry the South (by which they 
mean the white South), it has to move 
away from the traditional liberalism of the 
New Deal-Great Society eras toward a 
more conservative stance.
We may be faced in 
November, 1984, with a 
choice not unlike that 
seen in 1980.
In a recent issue of the New Republic, 
Jordan raised the “special in terest” 
canard by arguing that the Democratic 
Party is too liberal in part because it is the 
captive of “special interests” (Blacks, 
feminists, educators and labor) and that 
the Democratic nominee and platform 
should take a public stand in opposition to 
one or more of these groups.4 This 
“southern strategy” may appeal to the in­
terests and prejudices of southern whites 
but, for Blacks, it is a prescription for the 
“benign neglect” of the deepening crisis 
of the underclass.
Clearly, the foremost challenge of the 
Jackson candidacy is to articulate a 
“Black” strategy to counteract the emerg­
ing southern strategy of right wing white 
southern Democrats. Such a strategy is 
seen as imperative for several reasons.
First, the fundamental economic and 
social problems confronting Blacks re­
quire at a minimum the enactment of the 
unfinished liberal agenda and may, in fact, 
require the development of an explicit so­
cial democratic agenda along the lines of
the advanced democracies of Western 
Europe.
Second, the probability of Blacks sup­
porting a liberal-leftward strategy is 
rather high. For example, recent data in­
dicate 85% of Black Americans respond 
to domestic and foreign issues in a 
liberal-leftward way (see Norman Nie, S. 
Verba and J. Petrocik, The Changing 
American Voter, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 
253-55).
Finally, this strategy is imperative be­
cause Blacks are as important a part of 
the Democratic Party coalition as white 
southerners, contributing approximately 
20% of the party’s vote in recent national 
elections.5
These imperatives dictate a liberal- 
progressive agenda for any candidate who 
would seek to represent the Black com­
munity in presidential politics.
This paper is not intended to develop in 
detail the unfinished agenda of American 
liberalism but, at a minimum, such an 
agenda should include the following:
■ A reconstruction of the economic sys­
tem so that it provides maximum feasible 
employment for all citizens willing and 
able to work, at wages adequate to sus­
tain self and family.
■ Reform of the welfare system so that 
it is genuinely work-related, i.e., it oper­
ates to provide adequate income to those 
who cannot find work, to supplement the 
income of those who work but at inade­
quate wages (the working poor) and to 
provide decent support for those who for 
reasons of age or physical or mental hand­
icap cannot work.
■ A comprehensive national health in­
surance system with rigorous cost incen­
tives and controls on the health service 
industry.
■ Reform of the educational system to 
assure the widest availability of child-care
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and higher educational opportunities to all 
citizens.
■ Reform of the military budget to limit 
expenditures to strictly defined purposes 
of defense rather than war.
■ A comprehensive, federally-directed 
program to begin the re-industrialization 
of the nation and the rebuilding of its in­
frastructure with maximum feasible par­
ticipation of local citizens in planning and 
implementation.
■ A renewed commitment to the princi­
ple of affirmative action as requisite to 
social justice and equity.6
The Imperative of Full Employment
The central item on this agenda is the 
development of a comprehensive set of 
policies designed to achieve full employ­
ment in a relatively short period of time. 
Unemployment has been a longstanding 
problem in the Black community. Only 
three times between 1949 and 1974 did 
the official Black unemployment fall 
below 6% while for whites during the 
same period only twice did it rise above 
6%. This long term and persistent high 
unemployment is the major causal factor 
in the development of the Black under­
class and the “tangle of pathologies’' 
(female-headed households, crime, drug 
addiction, welfare dependency, al­
coholism, etc.) that characterize this part 
of the Black community.7
The national Black leadership has long 
recognized the centrality of unemploy­
ment in the Black predicament in the 
United States. It is sometimes over­
looked that the 1963 March on Washing­
ton was a march for “Jobs and Freedom. ” 
It is also often forgotten that when Martin 
Luther King was murdered he was pre­
paring to lead a Poor Peoples’ march in 
Washington whose central demand was 
full employment.
Also, at a 1973 conference of scholars 
called by the National Urban League to
consider post-civil rights issues, Profes­
sor Charles Hamilton presented a paper 
arguing that there should be a combined 
effort by civil rights and labor groups to 
initiate the vigorous push for a full em­
ployment bill. Finally, the centerpiece of 
the Congressional Black Caucus’ first 
Legislative Agenda was “The Equal Op­
portunity and Full Employment” bill.
Jesse Jackson’s candidacy 
is of great symbolic sig­
nificance. It represents 
another step in the his­
toric struggle by Blacks 
for equality of access and 
opportunity in the political 
process.
This bill, as originally introduced by the 
late Senator Hubert Humphrey and 
caucus member Augustus Hawkins, pro­
posed that the United States establish for 
each of its citizens a legal entitlement to a 
job enforceable through the courts; re­
quire the federal government to serve as 
employer of last resort and reduce unem­
ployment to three percent within 18 
months after passage. A revised version 
signed by President Carter deleted all of 
these provisions and substituted a vague 
promise to reduce unemployment to four 
percent within five years of enactment. 
These radical revisions of the bill were in 
part extracted by Carter in negotiations 
with the Congressional Black Caucus in 
exchange for his support.
Inadequate though the final act is, it 
does, as Congressman John Conyers {In 
These Times, November, 1978, p. 16) ar­
gues, provide “a framework for full em­
ployment planning. ” Among the elements
of a program that could be implemented 41 
under the act Congressman Conyers pro­
poses are: a massive targeted job training 
and employment program focusing on the 
revitalization of cities; a community- 
worker ownership program for aban­
doned industries; work sharing; and an 
anti-inflation program that deals with ad­
ministered pricing, excessive military 
spending, and some form of wage and 
price controls.8
A serious and potentially effective na­
tional full employment policy would entail 
integrating Conyer’s proposals into a 
comprehensive program to achieve price 
stabilization and economic revitalization.
This progressive program requires a 
party and candidates willing to commit 
themselves to a long term effort to rein­
vigorate the liberal agenda through well- 
reasoned and symbolically attractive 
political campaigns capable of unifying the 
nation’s disparate constituencies.
The first challenge of the Jackson cam­
paign, then, is to contribute to the devel­
opment of this as the new path for the 
Democratic Party in the last quarter of 
the 20th century.9
The Challenge of Political 
Independence
The second challenge to Jesse Jackson 
and the Democratic Party is in many ways 
more difficult than the first. This chal­
lenge requires that Jackson be willing and 
able to carry his insurgency into the gen­
eral election as an independent candidate 
if the Democratic Party yields to the 
pressures of its right wing and repudiates 
its progressive heritage and the liberal 
agenda.
The latter challenge is more difficult 
than the former because it would almost 
certainly lead to the re-election of Ronald 
Reagan, which would be contrary to the 
main 1984 objectives of many Black 
leaders.
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42 Yet even if Reagan were re-elected, it 
is conceivable Congress would at a mini­
mum reject further tax cuts, reductions in 
social expenditures or further increases 
in military outlays. Thus, assuming war is 
avoided, the worst of the “Reagan Revo­
lution” — from a Black standpoint — 
would be over in 1985, except for his con­
tinued attacks on the symbolic structure 
of Black rights and affirmative action.10
It should be emphasized, however, that 
an independent challenge by Jackson 
should be undertaken only if the Demo­
cratic nominee and the party’s platform 
reject a liberal and progressive agenda. In 
this eventuality, a democratic president 
— if elected in 1984 — is not likely to 
propose policies that fundamentally and 
specifically address Black needs and con­
cerns; rather he is more likely to be a 
Carter “clone” of Reagan, to use Senator 
Edward Kennedy’s phrase. As Con­
gressman John Conyers has written (The 
Progressive, November, 1983, p. 11):
Cutbacks in the Government’s redistribu­
tional programs and the military buildup 
did not begin with the Reagan Administra­
tion. The retreat from full employment as 
the guiding principle of economic policy 
took place under Jimmy Carter. And de­
spite their Congressional victories in No­
vember 1982, Democrats failed to seize the 
initiative and reverse the course of Rea­
ganomics. Instead, Democratic Congres­
sional leaders collaborated in a muddle of 
bipartisanship that only reinforced conser­
vative demands.
The collapse of liberal Democratic poli­
tics has left a gaping hole in both leadership 
and policy. After years of turning away 
from a commitment to equity, evading con­
troversial stands on urgent issues, and 
failing to advance farsighted programs, 
Democrats have become remote from the 
discontents as well as the dreams of ordi­
nary citizens. 11
Thus we may be faced in November,
1984, with a choice not unlike that seen in 
1980. In that event, many Blacks and pro­
gressives probably would stay at home or 
vote for John Anderson [based on the as­
sumption that he may run again] thereby 
re-electing Ronald Reagan anyway.12
If one believes there are other objec­
tives in the politics of presidential choice 
this year, then a case can be made for the 
feasibility of Jesse Jackson running as an 
independent.
The Jackson insurgency should have an 
importance that transcends the election 
of 1984. It can and should be used as part 
of a movement to establish an independ­
ent base of Black political power in the 
electoral process.13 While there are risks 
in this approach, we believe the potential 
long-term gains outweigh the potential 
short-term losses.
In addition to offering an alternative to 
the conservatism of the two-party sys­
tem, an independent candidacy would 
make unmistakably clear to the powers- 
that-be in the Democratic Party that the 
Black vote can no longer be taken for 
granted. A constant refrain of Democratic 
Party strategists (especially in private 
discussions) is that Black issues tend to 
be expensive and divisive and, therefore, 
should be ignored because in the general 
election the Black vote has no place to go 
but Democratic.
These strategists assume that the 
Black vote is safe, therefore, the party 
should adopt candidates and a platform 
designed to appeal to more problematic 
constituency groups, i.e., urban ethnics 
or white southerners. A Jackson chal­
lenge in the 1984 general election would 
fundamentally alter this strategic calcula­
tion.
Finally, assuming that Jackson wins at 
least five percent of the national vote and 
at least one-third of the Black vote, his 
candidacy would lay the organizational 
and financial base for the future construc­
tion of an on-going independent Black 
political base in national politics, and con­
tribute an important element to the build­
ing of an alternative progressive coalition 
within or outside the two-party system.
Conclusion
Choosing the president is arguably the 
most important act of American citizen­
ship. Jesse Jackson’s candidacy is thus of 
great symbolic significance, representing 
yet another step in the historic struggle 
by Blacks for equality of access and op­
portunity in the political process. Sym­
bolism is not unimportant in politics. 
However, we believe if this candidacy is 
to represent more than a symbolic act, 
Jackson and the Democratic Party must 
forthrightly address the challenges posed 
by the Black predicament.15
It is not possible to predict at the outset 
of the campaign what its outcome will be. 
Nor, however, was it possible at the out­
set to predict the outcome of the great 
civil rights campaigns at Birmingham and 
Selma. What is possible to predict is that 
if Jesse Jackson ignores the challenges 
posed herein, his campaign will not, as 
Professor Mack Jones of Atlanta Univer­
sity puts it, “represent a qualitative 
change in the nature of Black political par­
ticipation but rather more of the same.”16 
And more of the same represents a be­
trayal of the legitimate interests and aspi­
rations of Black people in the United 
States. □
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